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Abstract.
Conventional understandings of denial are rooted in the analysis of language used to negate claims of
genocide, and shed little light on the effects of denial beyond words heard or read. Is denying the
crime only concerned with refuting its occurrence? Is there more at stake in denying genocide crimes
than a lack of mutuality over whether it happened? To deny a crime is to deny what is owed those
harmed by the crime, and this involves accountability and restitution according to relevant law.
Written or spoken words that reject outright, re-characterize, confuse, or shift blame bring harm on
an emotional level, but the real omissions associated with denial come when the crime goes
unpunished. In acts by the Guatemalan state before, during and after its 2013 trial of former State
officials for genocide crimes we see a wider range of denial behavior. The findings in this paper
suggest that acts or failures to act that vacate duties to prosecute, adjudicate and penalize genocide
crimes go further in withholding what is due victims and society than does speech that rejects the
crime on a superficial level.
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Denial in Other Forms
Paul N. Avakian
Introduction
The study of denial as an element of genocide began after similarities had been noted in the ways 
in which the Armenian Genocide and Holocaust had been refuted. These similarities gave rise to 
classifications centered around verbal tactics, where the facts of a claimed genocide were disputed 
or called into question in one way or another. Spoken or written, these verbal devices ranged from 
outright and absolute rejections (nothing close to what you claim ever happened) to concessions 
of mass killing but denials of intent (the killing happened but not like you say). Between these 
two these poles the killing was justified by suggestions that the victims brought it on themselves 
and were somehow at fault, mitigated by arguing that a much smaller number were killed, re-
characterized as relocation casualties, or excused as an unavoidable result of war or civil conflict. 
Subsequent episodes of mass killing; Cambodia, Rwanda, Srebrenica, were similarly refuted 
and provided more data for these classifications; definitionalism, revisionism, minimization, 
relativisation, obfuscation, etc.—and thus emerged the prevalent notion of denial as the use of 
language to negate the claim of a genocide occurrence. 
In these analyses, little consideration had been given to denial in a form other than spoken 
or written refutations, or having consequences beyond the effect of words heard or read. Does 
denying the crime only require negating it orally or in papers and articles? And is denying the 
crime only concerned with refuting its occurrence? Is there more involved or at stake in denying 
genocide crimes other than a lack of agreement on whether it happened?  
The denier denies not only to suppress truth but to suppress what the truth means must happen. 
It is not just the label of genocide he seeks to avoid, but the consequences of genocide criminality: 
accountability, penalty, reparation. When the listener finishes hearing a denial, the denial is over 
and its aftereffects are variable and subjective. When the reader finishes reading a denial he may 
call it rubbish and tear it up. Neither is bound in any way to the denier’s words. This is not to say 
that there aren’t lasting or psychological effects of verbal denials.1 But when failures of duty to act 
toward genocide crimes obstruct prosecution, punishment, victim relief and reconciliation, then 
the victim is not making a choice about whether to let misrepresentations affect him. Then the 
denial has consequences beyond words and sentences, and society is prevented from penalizing 
the crime. The idea of justice for genocide does not necessarily involve or require recognition of the 
crime’s occurrence by the perpetrator government or third parties who have a stake in whether or 
not it occurred. Justice, according to international law, comes in the adjudication and punishment 
of the crime. And yet when we speak of genocide denial we refer to acts of speech and the lack of 
mutuality over its occurrence. If the concept of denial is associated with the withholding of justice, 
then it must refer to all acts and behaviors that interfere with that justice, and not just to spoken 
rejections of the crime. 
In acts by the Guatemalan state before, during and after its 2013 trial of former State officials 
for genocide crimes we see a wider range of denial behavior. In all other genocide trials the 
main prosecutorial action against perpetrators originated outside the state. In all other trials the 
proceedings were conducted by a convened UN delegation. State action is truncated when a third 
party convenes and conducts the trial. After a state has denied the crime verbally, there is nothing 
left for it to do. But when state agencies must play a role in the investigation and prosecution of 
genocide crimes, then we are exposed to another set of denial behaviors. 
Denial as Acts
Guatemala’s responsibility for prosecuting its massacre crimes2 falls to its Ministerio Público 
(Public Prosecutor’s Office3), which from the time of the massacres (1978-1983) until 2010 had been 
1 See, for example, Aida Alayarian, Consequences of Denial: The Armenian Genocide (London: Karnac Books, 2008).
2 See infra, section entitled Guatemala Background.
3 The Public Prosecutor’s Office, or Ministerio Público, in Guatemala, is equivalent to the US Department of Justice. 
The Public Prosecutor in Guatemala is equivalent to the Attorney General in the US.
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largely dormant toward the crimes; avoiding investigations, losing case files, purposely delaying 
prosecutions, ignoring witness evidence, etc. These acts are documented in two important studies; 
Impunity in Guatemala: The State’s Failure to Provide Justice in the Massacre Cases, published in 
2001, and the American Bar Association’s Prosecutorial Reform Index for Guatemala, an evaluation 
of Guatemala’s progress toward prosecutorial reform, published ten years later.4 Both reports 
found an organization unwilling to act, with prosecutors who were incompetent, indifferent, 
affected by bribes, poorly trained, and otherwise deficient in their responsibilities. Guatemala’s 
transition from a closed, private inquisitorial system of justice to a transparent adversarial system 
in 1994 had given the Ministerio Público (MP) full autonomy and authority in the investigation and 
prosecution of crimes against the people, to “see to the strict fulfillment of the country’s laws,”5 
to act “as soon as the [it] becomes aware of a punishable act,”6 where “no authority may give 
instructions to the head of the Ministerio Público or his subordinates regarding the way to carry 
out the criminal investigation or that limit the exercise of the action,”7 and where State officials 
are “legally responsible for their official conduct, subject to the law and never above it.”8 With the 
transition came a Código Procesal Penal (Criminal Procedure Code) modeled after the US system 
of justice that established open procedures and protocols for adjudicating crimes, and defined 
roles and responsibilities for prosecutors, the accused, and the courts. Fifteen Section Prosecutor’s 
Offices were established within the MP, including a special unit dedicated to prosecuting human 
rights crimes committed during Guatemala’s 1960-1996 internal armed conflict. Notwithstanding 
these reforms, however, by early 2009—almost three decades after the massacres—the State had 
only convicted one civilian out of the thousands who participated in the 626 massacres identified 
by a UN-sponsored truth commission.9 No action had been taken by the MP against any of the 
soldiers or military commanders in place at the time of the massacres that had planned, ordered 
and overseen the killing. Because these failures to act suppress the acknowledgement, prosecution 
and punishment of genocide crimes, they deny the crimes and what is due victims under law given 
by Guatemala’s Constitution, its Criminal Procedure Code, Código Penal (Penal Code), peace accord 
agreements, as well as its 1949 ratification of the United Nations Convention for the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNGC) law.10
The Impunity in Guatemala report also found acts of obstruction by the State’s military. Much 
of Guatemala had been militarized during its armed internal conflict, and the pervasive power 
4 Nathanial Heasley, et al., “Impunity in Guatemala: The State’s Failure to Provide Justice in the Massacre Cases,” 
American University International Law Review 16, no. 5 (2001), 1115-1194; American Bar Association, Prosecutorial 
Reform Index for Guatemala (Washington, DC: American Bar Association 2011).
5 Republic of Guatemala Political Constitution of 1985, Article CCLI, “The Public Ministry is an auxiliary 
institution of the public administration and the courts with autonomous functions whose principal goals are 
to see to the strict fulfillment of the country’s laws. Its organization and functioning will be regulated by its 
organic law.”
6 Republic of Guatemala, Código Procesal Penal, Article 289, Purpose and scope of the criminal prosecution. 
“As soon as the Public Prosecutor’s Office becomes aware of a punishable act, by denunciation or by any 
other means, must prevent the occurrence of further consequences or promote your research to require the 
prosecution of the accused. The exercise of the powers provided for in the three preceding Articles shall not 
relieve him of the research to ensure the essential elements of proof on the punishable act and its participants.”
7 Republic of Guatemala, Código Procesal Penal, Article 8, Independence of the Public Ministry. “The Public 
Ministry, as an institution, enjoys full independence for the exercise of criminal action and investigation of 
crimes in the manner determined in this Code, except for the hierarchical subordination established in its own 
law. No authority may instruct the head of the Public Prosecutor’s Office or his subordinates as to how to carry 
out the criminal investigation or limit the exercise of the action, except for the powers that this law grants to 
the courts.”
8 Republic of Guatemala Political Constitution of 1985, Article CLIV, Public Function; Subjection to the Law, 
“Officials are depositories of authority, legally responsible for their official conduct, subject to the law and 
never above it.”
9 Open Society Justice Initiative, Judging a Dictator: The Trial of Guatemala’s Ríos Montt (New York: Open Society 
Foundations, 2013), 2.
10 See Heasley, et al., Impunity in Guatemala, for a more comprehensive discussion of the Guatemalan State’s failure 
to act, and the domestic and international laws violated by this failure.
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of the military and its influence over the country’s institutions carried over after the cease-fire. 
Relative to prosecuting massacre crimes, this has manifested in two important ways. The first is 
the military’s suppression of evidence. By law, all affairs of the State are public information except 
where national security is an issue, and the military, like all government agencies, is required 
cooperate with criminal investigations and furnish records and reports as requested. But the State’s 
military has consistently refused requests for information about its operations in the regions where 
massacres occurred; denying that such information exists, maintaining that it exists but cannot 
be located, and deeming it information that if released would threaten national security. It also 
refused to cooperate with truth commission requests for information and interviews, despite this 
being a stipulation of peace agreements. What defines national security and what constitutes a 
threat to it is nowhere defined in Guatemala’s laws, and so the term and the information it protects 
is effectively controlled by the military—the perpetrator of the massacres. Guatemala’s Congress 
has the ability to define or clarify the term but has not done so, despite calls for such,11 and to 
the extent that this State inaction toward clarification or declassification has stood in the way of 
a genocide inquiry, it denies the crime. But the more conspicuous act of denial is the military’s 
withholding of evidence pertinent to and necessary for investigating, prosecuting and punishing 
the country’s massacre crimes. There is little credence in the claim that records of army operations 
against non-combatant Maya in the 1970s and 80s contains information that would make present-
day Guatemala vulnerable to external or even internal threats. These refusals to release records 
are open violations of Guatemala’s Constitution (“All the acts of administration are public. The 
interested parties are entitled to obtain at any time reports, copies, reproductions, and certifications 
that they request and the display of the proceedings that they may wish to consult, except when 
military or diplomatic matters relating to national security [are] involved”12) and its Criminal 
Procedure Code (“All public authorities and entities will cooperate with the Public Prosecutor’s 
Office, the courts and the police, and will promptly respond to the requests they receive from 
them”13). These refusals also violate provisions of Guatemala’s peace accords: “The Guatemalan 
people are entitled to know the full truth about the human rights violations and acts of violence 
that occurred in the context of the internal armed conflict,”14 and “all State bodies and entities [will] 
provide the Commission with the support necessary for the accomplishment of its tasks.”15 These 
acts withhold information necessary to establish facts and assess responsibility in genocide crimes, 
and thus deny truth, prosecution and punishment.
The second way in which the military has denied what is due victims and society according to 
UNGC law, is its interference with investigations through threats and bribes to judges, prosecutors 
and witnesses. Impunity in Guatemala found that intimidation by the State’s military was a frequent 
and significant barrier to the prosecution of massacre cases: “Such threats affect the judicial process 
by reducing the will of prosecutors and judges to pursue cases vigorously and to adjudicate them 
impartially. Threats against witnesses deter them from testifying and from urging prosecutors to 
move cases forward.”16 The report also found the use of bribery to deter prosecutions:
Corruption reportedly takes a variety of forms, all of which affect the resolution of massacre 
cases through improper influence by military personnel in both the judiciary and the 
Ministerio Publico. The most obvious form is direct corruption through bribes to prejudice 
specific judgments and resolutions of cases. A more subtle form is the use of influence within 
the government to manipulate the assignment of prosecutors or judges, so that the officials 
11 Ibid., 1172.
12 Republic of Guatemala Political Constitution of 1985, Article XXX.
13 Republic of Guatemala, Código Procesal Penal, Article 157.
14 United Nations General Assembly Security Council, Annex II: Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace, February 7, 
1997 (UN Doc. A/51/796-S/1997/114), 37, “The Guatemalan people are entitled to know the full truth about the 
human rights violations and acts of violence that occurred in the context of the internal armed conflict.”
15 United Nations, Annex II, 37; United Nations, Annex II: Agreement on the Basis for the Legal Integration of the Unidad 
Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca, December 12, 1996 (UN Doc. A/51/776-S/1997/51), Part III(A), Article 18.
16 Heasley, et al., Impunity in Guatemala, 1136.
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most capable of handling complex massacre cases are not always assigned to such cases. 
Both kinds of corruption greatly undermine the State’s prosecution efforts.17
These also are acts of genocide denial in that they block truth and prosecution.
Acts in Denial Literature
Only scant references to denial as something other than an act of speech are found in the literature 
on denial. Most scholarly writings on the subject deal with it as statement refutations. Perhaps to 
sum the writing that preceded him, Henry Theriault in 2013 wrote that the denial of genocide is 
a “verbal strategy consisting of assertions that events that constitute genocide are not happening 
or did not happen, or that the events in question are or were something other than genocide.”18 
Stanley Cohen’s 2001 States of Denial deals with denial as variations on words that deceive; where 
the denial is literal, interpretive or implicatory.19 Here again, denial is equated with using words 
to dispute facts in one way or another. Most all of Israel Charny’s work also concerns the various 
verbalized arguments put forth to call into question genocide occurrence. However in a 2012 
version of his “A Classification of Denials of the Holocaust and Other Genocides” Charny refers to 
denial as the obstruction of facts:
5.02 Denials as obstruction, distortion or misuse of information, evidence and research of 
facts of genocidal murder e.g., a dedicated liberal pacifist organization claimed that the 
reported brutal evacuation of Phnom Pen by the Khmer Rouge was part and parcel of a 
sincere agrarian revolution designed to improve the lives of the Cambodian people.20
The example he uses leans more toward an interpretive verbal denial but his identification of 
the obstruction of information as a means of denial is a recognition of denial as something other than 
an act of speech. One assumes that by obstruction he means the act of withholding information or 
evidence as in what Guatemala’s military has done. In the same document Charny makes another 
reference to denial as active suppression when he links denial with a failure to act toward the crime: 
“5.04 Denial as opposition, resistance and procrastination in activating meaningful interventions in 
ongoing genocidal events despite the fact that they have been identified as genocide.”21 Here the 
reference is to intervention in an ongoing genocide but the connection between denial and a failure 
to act toward genocide crimes is established.
In Remembrance and Denial, Richard Hovannisian describes action taken by the Turkish 
government to suppress the production of a film about the Armenian genocide, and also to deter 
the US government from designating April 24 (the date that began the massacre of Armenians) as 
a day of remembrance for genocide victims.22 In both cases, Turkey engaged in acts to enlist the US 
State Department to perpetuate denial. These are acts of denial by the Turkish and US governments 
that block the recognition of a genocide, and are different both in method and effect than their 
verbal refutations. 
Of course, the more familiar forms of denial are also found in the Guatemalan state’s response 
to the prospect of genocide criminality. Otto Pérez Molina, Guatemala’s then-president, told the 
17 Ibid., 1147.
18 Henry C. Theriault, “Denial of Ongoing Atrocities as a Rationale for Not Attempting to Prevent or Intervene,” 
in Impediments to the Prevention and Intervention of Genocide, ed. Samuel Totten (New Brunswick: Transaction 
Publishers, 2013), 47.
19 Stanley Cohen, States of Denial: Knowing about Atrocities and Suffering (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2013).
20 Israel W. Charny, “A Classification of Denials of the Holocaust and Other Genocides—updated 2012,” The 
Institute on the Holocaust and Genocide, accessed September 6, 2017, http://www.ihgjlm.com/a-classification-
of-denials-of-the-holocaust-and-other-genocides-updated-2012/.
21 Charny, A Classification of Denials.
22 Richard G. Hovannisian, Remembrance and Denial: The Case of the Armenian Genocide (Detroit: Wayne State 
University Press, 1998), 222-223.
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public before,23 during,24 and after25 Guatemala’s 2013 genocide trial, “There was no genocide,” 
despite also endorsing the trial. In an interview given during his presidential campaign he offered 
to prove that genocide did not occur.26 Pérez Molina had been an army general stationed in the 
region where the massacres occurred, and during the trial a witness for the prosecution had placed 
him at the scene of the massacres.27 (Pérez Molina was jailed in September 2015 after resigning 
the presidency on charges of corruption.) In defense testimony during the trial, Antonio Arenales 
Forno, then Secretary of Peace for President Pérez Molina, told the court “There was no genocide.” 
Also while the trial was still in session, Guatemala’s congress, by an 87 to 24 vote, approved a 
nonbinding resolution denying the possibility of genocide criminality, using the language: “the 
criminal offenses cited were legally impossible in Guatemala.”28 After the trial, in May 2014, 
Guatemala’s Minister of Interior, Mauricio López Bonilla, told an audience at the Royal Institute 
of International Affairs in London: “There was no genocide. If we are clear about what it means to 
commit a crime against humanity, that did not happen in Guatemala.”29 
But more than statements, or failures by the State’s Ministerio Público and military, the 
Guatemalan state’s rejection of genocide criminality was most resolute in rulings made by its 
Constitutional Court—Guatemala’s highest legal authority—before, during and after the 2013 
genocide trial. Guatemala’s Constitutional Court, tasked with ensuring constitutionality in lower 
court rulings and other matters of law, issued twelve resolutions during the trial. Three in particular 
had direct bearings on the outcome of the case and resulted in the annulment of the verdict and 
trial testimony. One ruling prior to the trial and three after also favored deterrence of a genocide 
finding. Each of the seven rulings violated Guatemala’s Constitutional law, its Criminal Procedure 
Code, and its commitments to UNGC law. These rulings, and the presence of denial in them, are 
the subject of this paper. 
Guatemala Background
In 1999 La Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico (the Guatemalan Commission for Historical 
Clarification or CEH) released the results of its three-year study of Guatemala’s nearly three-
decade internal conflict. The Commission had been formed as part of the 1996 peace accords that 
ended the conflict, on stipulation that the Commission’s report would not name names and that 
its findings could not be used in a court of law. Its purpose was not necessarily to make a genocide 
determination, but to document the human rights abuses committed by both sides during the 
conflict.30 But the Commission had been moved by the apparent intent of the State to annihilate 
groups of Maya. In a section titled Acts of Genocide, its twelve-volume report read in part:
23 Martin Rodriguez Pellecer, “Quiero que Alguien me Demuestre que Hubo Genocidio,” Plaza Publica, July 
25, 2011, accessed September 22, 2017, http://www.plazapublica.com.gt/content/quiero-que-alguien-me-
demuestre-que-hubo-genocidio.
24 Agencia EFE, “Pérez Molina: Genocide Trial Endangers Peace,” Plaza Publica, April 16, 2013, accessed September 
22, 2017, https://www.plazapublica.com.gt/content/perez-molina-tambien-afirma-que-el-juicio-por-genocidio-
hace-peligrar-la-paz.
25 Laura Carasik, “Justice Postponed in Guatemala,” Boston Review, May 28, 2013, accessed September 22, 2017, 
http://bostonreview.net/world/justice-postponed-guatemala, “When asked whether the guilty verdict changed 
his opinion that genocide did not occur in Guatemala, Perez Molina replied it did not.”
26 Rodriguez Pellecer, Quiero que Alguien.
27 Shawn Roberts, “Day 10: Witness Implicates President Perez Molina in Massacres,” International Justice Monitor, 
April 5, 2013, accessed March 27, 2018, https://www.ijmonitor.org/2013/04/day-10-witness-implicates-
president-perez-molina-in-massacres/.
28 Associated Press, “Guatemala’s Congress Votes to Deny Genocide,” Daily Mail, May 14, 2014, accessed 
September 22, 2017, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/ap/article-2628310/Guatemalas-congress-votes-deny-
genocide.html.
29 Agencia EFE, “López Bonilla Afirma en Londres que “no Hubo Genocidio” en Guatemala,” La Noticia en 
Guatemala,  May 6, 2014, accessed September 22, 2017, http://lanoticiaenguatemala.com/lopez-bonilla-afirma-
en-londres-que-no-hubo-genocidio-en-guatemala/.
30 For more on the formation of the CEH, and its charter, see Elizabeth Oglesby and Amy Ross, “Guatemala’s 
Genocide Determination and the Spatial Politics of Justice,” Space and Polity 13, no. 1 (2009), 21-39.
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...The reiteration of destructive acts, directed systematically against groups of the Mayan 
population, within which can be mentioned the elimination of leaders and criminal acts 
against minors who could not possibly have been military targets, demonstrates that the 
only common denominator for all the victims was the fact that they belonged to a specific 
ethnic group and makes it evident that these acts were committed “with intent to destroy, in 
whole or in part” these groups (Article II, first paragraph of the Convention).31
... in light of Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, the killing of members of Mayan groups occurred (Article II.a), serious bodily or 
mental harm was inflicted (Article II.b) and the group was deliberately subjected to living 
conditions calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part (Article 
11.c). The conclusion is also based on the evidence that all these acts were committed ‘with 
intent to destroy, in whole or in part’ groups identified by their common ethnicity, by reason 
thereof, whatever the cause, motive or final objective of these acts may have been (Article II, 
first paragraph).32
Preceding its conclusion that genocide had been committed by the State’s military in four regions 
of Guatemala between 1981 and 1983 were the following findings:
• The majority of human rights violations occurred with the knowledge or by order of the 
highest authorities of the State. Evidence from different sources (declarations made by 
previous members of the armed forces, documentation, declassified documents, data from 
various organisations, testimonies of well-known Guatemalans) all coincide with the fact 
that the intelligence services of the Army, especially the G-2 and the Presidential General 
Staff (Estado Mayor Presidencial), obtained information about all kinds of individuals 
and civic organisations, evaluated their behaviour in their respective fields of activity, 
prepared lists of those actions that were to be repressed for their supposedly subversive 
character and proceeded accordingly to capture, interrogate, torture, forcibly disappear or 
execute these individuals.33
• These massacres and the so-called scorched earth operations, as planned by the State, 
resulted in the complete extermination of many Mayan communities, along with their 
homes, cattle, crops and other elements essential to survival. The CEH registered 626 
massacres attributable to these forces.34
• The Army destroyed ceremonial centres, sacred places and cultural symbols. Language 
and dress, as well as other elements of cultural identification, were targets of repression. 
Through the militarization of the communities, the establishment of the PAC and the 
military commissioners, the legitimate authority structure of the communities was broken; 
the use of their own norms and procedures to regulate social life and resolve conflicts was 
prevented; the exercise of Mayan spirituality and the Catholic religion was obstructed, 
prevented or repressed; the maintenance and development of the indigenous peoples’ 
way of life and their system of social organisation was upset. Displacement and refuge 
exacerbated the difficulties of practising their own culture.35
• The aim of the perpetrators was to kill the largest number of group members possible. 
Prior to practically all these killings, the Army carried out at least one of the following 
preparatory actions: carefully gathering the whole community together; surrounding 
the community; or utilising situations in which the people were gathered together for 
celebrations or market days.36
31 La Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico, Memory of Silence: Report of the Commission for Historical 
Clarification (Guatemala: CEH, 1999), 39.
32 Ibid., 41.
33 Ibid., 38.
34 Ibid., 34.
35 Ibid., 35.
36 Ibid., 39.
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The CEH devoted significant time and space to understanding the roots of Guatemala’s armed 
conflict, and found a society marked by exclusion and antagonism; an authoritarian state, racist in 
its precepts and practices, slanted toward protecting the interests of its privileged minority, and 
given to repression.37 
Chief among the causes of inequality in this agrarian society was land ownership. Independence 
from Spain in 1821 left Guatemala an agrarian feudal state, where seventy percent of its land was 
owned by two percent of the population, most of the land idle and inaccessible to its peasant masses. 
Not until 1945 did Guatemala have the political climate to take on the land issue, first through 
President Juan José Arévalo, whose Congress passed a law requiring large landowners to rent land 
to the landless, and then through President Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán, whose 1952 “Decree 900” 
required landowners to sell off a portion of their idle land. United Fruit Corporation, Guatemala’s 
largest landowner and employer at the time, objected to the mandate, and petitioned the Eisenhower 
administration to intervene on claims of communism. On June 18, 1954 the CIA staged a coup, 
removing Arbenz and installing a US-loyalist dictator who repealed the land reform law. The 
overthrow kindled a reform solidarity among Guatemala’s marginalized, which, without success 
through peaceful means, evolved into an armed insurrection. In the 1960s the rebellion gained 
momentum, and Guatemala’s military, newly trained in communist insurgency warfare under the 
US Doctrine of National Security, began assassinating and disappearing students, intellectuals and 
labor leaders in the nation’s urban centers. In the 1970s, in Guatemala’s countryside communities 
where reformist ideology had spread, the military brutalized communities to make examples out 
of reform sympathizers, and recruited peasants into citizen patrol networks to augment and assist 
the repression.38 
By the early 1980s the military still hadn’t been able to quell the reform movement, and in 
1982 José Efraín Ríos Montt, a former army general, took power by coup and set his focus on 
ridding the country of reformists. Through offers of reconciliation and broadcasted messages of 
morality and solidarity, Ríos Montt appealed to the insurgents’ duty as Guatemalans to fall in line 
with the healing and rebuilding of the country. But when these failed he launched a full offensive 
against insurgents and communities suspected of harboring them.39 The 17-month period during 
which Ríos Montt commanded the military accounts for the most concentrated period of group 
killing in Guatemala’s 1960-1996 internal conflict.40 In the end, an estimated 250,000 Guatemalan 
citizens had been killed or disappeared; the result of brutal methods involving torture, rape, and 
dismemberment. A reported million more fled the country.41
Movement toward peace began in the early 1990s when the country’s elites, feeling the 
effects of the conflict on their businesses, pressed the government to end the war.42 With the UN 
brokering conditions for surrender between the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity and 
the Guatemalan government, a peace agreement was signed by the parties in December 1996. 
The agreement promised fundamental changes in Guatemala, including accountability for the 
murdered and disappeared, recognition and respect for indigenous rights, labor reform, government 
 
 
37 Ibid., 17-20.
38 For expanded accounts of this period in Guatemala’s history see Greg Grandin, Deborah T. Levenson and 
Elizabeth Oglesby, ed, The Guatemalan Reader: History, Culture, Politics (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2011), 1-9, 107-500; Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit: The Story of 
the American Coup in Guatemala (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982).
39 See Gleijeses, Shattered Hope.
40 La Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico, Memory of Silence, 24. According to the report, “More than half 
the [conflict’s 626] massacres and scorched earth operations” occurred between 1981 and 1983. Ríos Montt held 
power from March 23, 1982 until August 8, 1983.  
41 Ibid., 30.
42 For more on Guatemala’s peace process, see Jemima García-Godos and Luis Raúl Salvadó, “Guatemala: 
Truth and Memory on Trial,” in Transitional Justice in Latin America: The Uneven Road from Impunity Towards 
Accountability, ed. Elin Skaar, et al. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), 205.
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anti-impunity, education and healthcare programs, land redistribution, democratizing Guatemala 
political institutions, and army reform.43 
The Case Against Ríos Montt
In 1999, the year the CEH released its report linking him to genocidal massacres, Ríos Montt was 
elected president of Guatemala’s congress. By law, his status as a member of Parliament exempted 
him from criminal prosecution. In 2009, a 359-page packet of military documents marked secreto 
surfaced. It contained original plans, directives, telegrams, maps, and patrol reports that ordered 
and documented the rounding up and killing of unarmed men, women and children as well as 
the burning of homes, destruction of crops, slaughter of animals and aerial bombing of those 
who tried to escape the violence. According to the US National Security Archive, to who the 
packet was turned over, the documents establish firsthand chain-of-command “evidence of Ríos 
Montt’s deliberate policy of repression and terror against the Ixil Mayans.”44 In 2010, Claudia 
Paz y Paz Bailey assumed control of the Ministerio Público, replacing a sitting Prosecutor General 
who resigned after he’d been linked to corruption. Paz y Paz brought experience litigating cases 
in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to an MP function that had seen nine Prosecutor 
Generals in the sixteen years of its existence (giving an average term length of just over twenty-
two months for the four-year post). Paz y Paz removed non-performing prosecutors and those 
with ties to the military, and made Guatemala’s lingering human rights abuse cases a top priority. 
In 2012, after he had lost his seat in Congress, Ríos Montt was indicted along with his then-
director of military intelligence on charges of genocide and crimes against humanity for the group 
killing of 1,771 Ixil Maya, the forced displacement of 29,000, sexual violence against at least eight 
women, and torture of at least fourteen.45 Most believed politics would intervene and the case 
would not reach trial.46 On March 19, 2013 opening arguments began before a three-member 
tribunal despite varied efforts by defense counsel to impugn and suspend the trial before it began. 
Ríos Montt’s lawyer, who told the court he had been hired hours earlier, was ejected for 
obstruction on the opening day when he persisted with his demand for tribunal members to recuse 
themselves for bias against him.47 In the coming days, multiple objections to the proceedings were 
filed by defense counsel for both accused in the form of amparos which required resolution by 
Guatemala’s Constitutional Court. The trial was suspended for ten days when an evidence 
judge declared the trial annulled.48 In all, 100 survivor eyewitnesses recounted family 
members who were shot at close range, hacked to death with machetes, bludgeoned with 
rocks and knives, strangled to death, burned alive, raped, and played with like toys and 
animals. Little was heard from the defense to directly refute their testimony. Instead counsel 
for both defendants focused on disqualifying the trial, tribunal judges, and prosecution expert 
witnesses.49 
43 United Nations General Assembly Security Council, Annex II.
44 From the author’s February 2013 interview with Kate Doyle, senior analyst, US National Security Archive.
45 Hugo Alvarado, “Ríos Montt Enfrentará Juicio por Genocidio y Delitos de Lesa Humanidad,” Prensa Libre, 
January 28, 2013. First Instance Judge, Carol Patricia Flores, at the indictment: “We can establish that these 
are acts so degrading, so humiliating, that there is no justification. You, Señor Efraín Ríos Montt, could have 
prevented these crimes. We agree with the prosecutor›s judgment that you, Señor Efraín Ríos Montt, probably 
participated in these acts of genocide and crimes against humanity.” 
46 From author dialogue with transitional justice scholars and advocates in Guatemala and the US prior to the trial.
47 Emi Maclean, “Trial Opens with Statements, Prosecution Witnesses, After Defense Challenges Rejected,” 
International Justice Monitor, March 20, 2013, accessed March 22, 2018, https://www.ijmonitor.org/2013/03/trial-
opens-with-prosecution-witnesses-after-defense-challenges-rejected/.
48 Kate Doyle, “Day 20: Defense Attorneys Walk Out of Trial in Protest; Preliminary Court Judge Annuls Trial as 
Attorney General Calls Action Illegal and Promises Legal Challenge,” International Justice Monitor, April 19, 
2013, accessed March 22, 2018, https://www.ijmonitor.org/2013/04/day-20-defense-attorneys-walk-out-of-trial-
in-protest-preliminary-court-judge-annuls-sentence-as-attorney-general-calls-action-illegal-and-promises-
legal-challenge/.
49 See Open Society Justice Initiative, Judging a Dictator, 7-12.
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On May 10, the tribunal rendered a guilty verdict against Ríos Montt and sentenced him to 
an eighty-year prison term. His co-defendant, Jose Mauricio Rodríguez Sánchez, was absolved of 
charges. On May 20, Guatemala’s Constitutional Court, without a verdict appeal by Ríos Montt, 
annulled the verdict and trial testimony.50 
Denial in Constitutional Court Rulings
In the course of its study on the causes of Guatemala’s State-on-citizen violence, the CEH found 
the State’s judiciary was largely idle in the decades of the conflict—deliberately failing to apply 
the law, “tolerating, and even facilitating, violence,” and sheltering State acts of repression.51 Even 
after reforms to Guatemala’s judicial function brought by its 1994 Criminal Procedure Code, both 
the Impunity in Guatemala and Prosecutorial Reform reports found corruption common at all levels 
of the State’s judiciary,52 where threatened judges “may dismiss cases, fail to issue arrest warrants, 
allow pre-trial release of suspects, make improperly favorable evidentiary rulings for the defense, 
or affect the prosecution through other administrative procedures of the court.”53
A politicized process of judgeship inherently jeopardizes judicial independence in Guatemala, 
where judges are appointed through personal connections or as favors, rather than because of 
qualifications or experience.54 This has created an inclination for judges to rule toward outcomes 
that favor the causes and positions of those responsible for their appointment.55 Guatemala’s 
Constitutional Court is comprised as such. Its five judges are appointed one-each by the Supreme 
Court, Congress, President, the Higher University Council of the University of San Carlos, and the 
Assembly of the Bar Association56—each appointer with their own agenda and political interests.57 
The Constitutional Court’s main function is to defend constitutionality in Guatemala’s laws, trial 
proceedings and judgements, treaties and legislative bills, and jurisdiction conflicts.58 Its formation 
in 1985 has played an important role toward the rule of law in Guatemala, but rulings in recent years 
have raised questions about its integrity.59 A Court ruling in the year 2000 overturned first instance 
and appellate court verdicts to grant amnesty to defendants charged with crimes against humanity 
in the 1982 Dos Erres massacre, despite Guatemalan law that excludes crimes against humanity 
from amnesty and despite provisions in its Constitution that limit the Court’s jurisdiction to the 
constitutionality of subordinate rulings and not the substance or merit of cases.60 Here, the Court 
exceeded its constitutional mandate to rule that crimes against humanity had not occurred in Dos 
50 Guatemala Constitutional Court, Case File 1904-2013, May 20, 2013. See infra May 20, 2013 Due Process Violation 
and Verdict Annulment Ruling.
51 La Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico, Memory of Silence, 24.
52 Heasley et al., Impunity in Guatemala, 1162.
53 Ibid., 1149.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 Republic of Guatemala Political Constitution of 1985, Article CCLXIX, Organization of the Court of 
Constitutionality.
57 From the author’s 2012 email exchange with Daniel M. Brinks, law professor and co-director of the Rapoport 
Center for Human Rights and Justice at the University of Texas Austin. “The delegation of appointment powers 
to these outside entities has led to the politicization of those entities [and] a fair amount of contestation by the 
dominant political parties. The situation is exacerbated because the magistrates serve short, renewable terms, 
so that if they wish to be reappointed they must remain in the good graces of those who named them.”
58 Republic of Guatemala Political Constitution of 1985, Articles CCLXXI and CCLXXII.
59 García-Godos et al., Guatemala: Truth and Memory on Trial, 215. “On several occasions, the Supreme Court and, 
particularly, the Constitutional Court have gone beyond their mandates, intervening in lower courts’ handling 
of human rights cases involving members of the armed forces.”
60 Guatemala Constitutional Court, Case File 55-89, June 13, 1989, “[an appeal to the Constitutional Court] is not 
meant to replace the legal protection offered by the ordinary justice system ... and we must prevent the undue 
use of the constitutional justice with the aim of reviewing the decisions of ordinary courts on the merits, 
given that the role of the [Constitutional Court] is not to decide on the substantive claims of the parties to the 
proceedings, but rather to examine whether the rights guaranteed by the Constitutional and the statutes have 
been respected or not ... .”
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Erres. At times the Court has shown favor to Ríos Montt. A notable example is the Court’s 2003 
ruling to allow him to run for president despite Constitutional law that disqualifies any who took 
power by coup from ever seeking the presidency.61 In 2000, the Frente Republicano Guatemalteco 
party, presided over by Ríos Montt, was found to have manipulated nominations to the Court.62  
When rulings by Guatemala’s highest legal authority consistently violate laws set forth by 
Guatemala’s Constitution, its Criminal Procedure Code, and commitments to international 
treaties, there is reason for inquiry into the basis for that Court’s rulings. Was there sound reason 
for the Court’s deviations from what law provides and mandates? Were the rulings impartial 
and objective, or were they prejudiced toward denying the crime of genocide and inhibiting its 
prosecution? Were they proportionate toward a fair and just outcome, or did they unduly favor the 
defendants and a no-genocide finding? Here we examine seven Constitutional Court rulings63 and 
their effect on Guatemala’s inquiry into genocide criminality. 
December 12, 2007 Ruling to Reject Audiencia Nacional Jurisdiction64
Under the provisions of universal jurisdiction law, the Rigoberta Menchú Foundation in 1999 
brought a case against Ríos Montt and five other ex-high-level commanders to the Audiencia Nacional 
in Madrid, accusing them of genocide, torture, and forced disappearance in the 1982-83 massacres 
of Ixil-Maya. The plaintiffs cited Article 23.4 of the Judicial Power Organization Act (LOPJ) which 
provides Audiencia Nacional with jurisdiction in crimes of genocide and terrorism committed 
outside of Spain. In March 2000, the Audiencia Nacional accepted the case after concluding that 
Guatemala’s legal system had failed to investigate the crimes. In July 2006 the Audiencia Nacional 
issued international arrest warrants for the accused followed by extradition requests, citing a 1895 
Extradition Treaty between Spain and Guatemala as basis along with LOPJ law. In November 2006, 
a Guatemalan trial court executed four of the six warrants, and rejected warrants for Ríos Montt 
and a former army chief-of-staff. Two of the accused were arrested and detained for extradition. 
The arrests were appealed but Guatemalan courts found the warrants proper and binding. Lawyers 
for the two detained then challenged the authority of the warrants by appeal to Guatemala’s 
Constitutional Court. On December 12, 2007 the Court ruled the warrants invalid and nonbinding, 
and ordered the detainees’ release. No further action was taken by the Audiencia Nacional against 
the other defendants.65 
In its sixty-page ruling the Court accepted the Spain-Guatemala treaty but reasoned that the 
treaty’s extradition requirement is specific to asylum-seekers and does not apply to nationals living 
in the country where the crimes were committed, and that therefore it does not apply to crimes 
committed in Guatemala.66 
With regard to LOPJ Article 23.4, the Court argued that it cannot recognize the jurisdiction of 
an extraterrestrial court because to do so would be to allow a state to judge another state’s ability or 
willingness to prosecute its own crimes, that Audiencia Nacional does not have that power or right, 
61 Republic of Guatemala Political Constitution of 1985, Article CLXXXVI, Prohibitions Against Running for the 
Positions of President or Vice President of the Republic. The following cannot run for the positions of President 
or Vice President of the Republic: a. The leader or the chiefs of a coup d’état, armed revolution or similar 
movement, who have altered the constitutional order, or those who as a consequence of such events have 
assumed the leadership of the government.
62 Siri Glopin, Roberto Gargarella, and Elin Skaar, Democratization and the Judiciary: The Accountability Function of 
Courts in New Democracies (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 105.
63 More than other rulings by Guatemala’s Constitutional Court, these seven, in the author’s view, provide the best 
opportunity for observing Court behavior toward the question of genocide criminality.
64 Guatemala Constitutional Court, Case File 3380-2007, December 12, 2007.
65 For an expanded discussion of events and rulings related to the Menchú Foundation case against Ríos Montt 
and others see Amy Ross, “The Ríos Montt Case and Universal Jurisdiction,” Journal of Genocide Research 18, 
Nos. 2–3 (2016), 361–376; Naomi Roht-Arriaza, “Criminal Prosecutions for Genocide in Guatemala: Advances 
and Obstacles in Transnational and Domestic Cases,” in Quiet Genocide, ed. Etelle Higonnet (New Brunswick: 
Transaction Publishers, 2009); and Naomi Roht-Arriaza, “Guatemala Genocide Case. Judgment, No. STC 
237/2005,” American Journal of International Law 100, 1 (2006), 207-213, doi:10.2307/3518840.
66 See Roht-Arriaza, Criminal Prosecutions for Genocide, 147.
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and therefore its extradition order has no authority.67 But it is precisely this scenario that LOPJ law 
seeks to address. The language of Article 23.4 explicitly recognizes and requires extradition: “ ... 
this concept of universal jurisdiction allows criminal proceedings to be brought even where the 
accused is not present in Spanish territory; this requires the subsequent initiation of extradition 
proceedings.” Therefore there is no logic in this aspect of the Court’s ruling. 
The Court rejected extradition on other grounds, citing Article 27 of Guatemala’s Constitution 
which, the Court argued, prohibits the handing over of Guatemalans to foreign governments. But 
the language of Article 27 makes an exception where international treaties call for such extradition: 
“The extradition of Guatemalans will not be initiated for political crimes who in no case will be 
handed over to a foreign government, except for what is agreed upon in treaties and conventions 
regarding crimes against humanity or against international law.” 
The Court further argued that the genocide, torture, and forced disappearance crimes charged 
by the Menchú Foundation were “common crimes connected to political crimes” and as such, 
not subject to Guatemala’s UNGC extradition obligations.68 But UNGC law expressly forbids 
the characterization of genocidal acts as political crimes for the purpose of avoiding extradition: 
“Genocide and the other acts enumerated in Article III shall not be considered as political crimes 
for the purpose of extradition. The Contracting Parties pledge themselves in such cases to grant 
extradition in accordance with their laws and treaties in force.”69 Here the Court exceeds what it 
was asked to rule on by the lower court (whether Audiencia Nacional’s extradition requests violate 
Guatemala’s Constitution) to publish an opinion on the nature of the armed conflict and make a 
ruling based on that opinion. This is a clear overstep of the Court’s constitutional charter limiting 
the Court to protecting constitutionality in the State’s legal affairs.
The Court’s liberal interpretation of the intent of the Spain-Guatemala Treaty, its disregard for 
exceptions to the laws it cites as the basis of its ruling, and its improper judgement of the conflict to 
deny extradition, all suggest a Court intent on deterring a genocide inquiry by Audiencia Nacional. 
UN and Constitutional law make clear Guatemala’s obligation to comply with extradition. But the 
Court seems to go out of its way to interpret law in ways that avoid those obligations, and thus 
“implicitly rejects the charge of genocide.”70 
April 3, 2013 Defense Evidence Admissibility Ruling71
On April 3, twelve days into the Ríos Montt trial, the Constitutional Court, in response to an 
appeal filed by Ríos Montt’s defense, issued an order for the tribunal to incorporate into trial 
proceedings defense evidence that had been ruled inadmissible. The Court’s ruling overturned a 
ruling made by pretrial judge Miguel Ángel Gálvez, who found that Ríos Montt’s counsel hadn’t 
provided foundation for expert witnesses it planned to call; that it had submitted only names 
without anything to substantiate or demonstrate their expertise, and that in place of documentary 
evidence, counsel had provided only requests for that information that it had filed with the holders 
of the evidence.72 According to the rules of evidence in Guatemala’s Criminal Procedure Code, 
Gálvez was correct and had just cause in rejecting the evidence in question. Article 183 of the Code 
67 Guatemala Constitutional Court, Case File 3380-2007, December 12, 2007.
68 Roht-Arriaza, Criminal Prosecutions for Genocide, 148.
69 United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 260 - Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, December 9, 1948 (UN Doc. A/RES/260(III)), Article VII, accessed March 21, 2018, http://www.
refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3ac0.html.
70 Roht-Arriaza, Criminal Prosecutions for Genocide, 149. “By so labeling the conflict, the Court implicitly rejects the 
charge of genocide.”  
71 Guatemala Constitutional Court Case File 1097-2013, April 23, 2013.
72 See Kate Doyle, “Update on Guatemalan Genocide Trial,” Unredacted (blog), The National Security Archive Blog, 
February 5, 2013, accessed May 3, 2017, https://nsarchive.wordpress.com/2013/02/05/update-on-guatemalan-
genocide-trial/. “Gálvez pointed out that [the defense] had submitted the names of experts (such as retired 
general José Luis Quilo Ayuso) without providing their analysis or expert reports, rendering them invalid. The 
judge also explained that rather than enter documents into evidence, Ríos Montt’s attorneys had submitted 
last-minute requests for Ministry of Defense records, which they hoped to obtain through a court order. In 
effect, the judge was pointing out the failure of the defense team to do the work that the case required.”
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(Proof of Inadmissibility) requires that evidence submitted has substance related to the discovery 
of truth: “A means of proof, to be admitted, must refer directly and indirectly to the object of the 
inquiry and be useful for the discovery of the truth.”73 Submitting names only ignores and fails this 
requirement. Article 186 (Evidence Valuation) requires that evidence must be present and have 
been submitted into the trial according to Code procedure: “Any evidence to be valued must have 
been obtained by a permitted procedure and incorporated into the process in accordance with the 
provisions of this Code. The elements of evidence thus incorporated shall be valued, according 
to the system of sound reasoned criticism, and may not be subject to other legal limitations other 
than those expressly provided for in this Code.”74 Submitting notices of evidence sought or filed 
for thus have no value. The Court’s override of Gálvez’ ruling is an abandonment of these criminal 
procedure laws to favor the defense, which, by ignoring evidence rules, shows disregard for the 
laws and the court. While the evidence in question had no bearing on the case, and the ruling posed 
no interference with a genocide inquiry, the ruling again shows the Court’s willingness to vacate 
law, and to overlook the defense’s show of disrespect toward the proceedings.
April 23, 2013 Rulings to Transfer Case to Judge Flores75 and to Reinstate García Gudiel76
On April 18, almost a month after the Ríos Montt trial began, pretrial judge Carol Patricia Flores 
held a hearing pursuant to the Ríos Montt genocide case in which she declared the trial annulled 
and ordered the case returned to its November 23, 2011 pretrial status. Flores was the original 
pretrial judge who indicted Ríos Montt on the genocide charge. She had been recused from the case 
and replaced by Judge Gálvez after a bias claim by Ríos Montt’s defense. On appeal the Supreme 
Court had found her recusal improper, and with her April 18 hearing, Flores, without notice to 
the trial court, had reassumed the role of the evidence judge assigned to the case and was calling 
it back to its November 23, 2011 status, the day she had been recused. On April 19 the trial court 
suspended trial proceedings pending Constitutional Court instructions on the constitutionality of 
Flores’ order.77 
On April 22 the Court issued a ruling instructing the trial court to transfer to Judge Flores the 
Ríos Montt case file, and for Flores to issue an order to the court to allow the contested defense 
evidence into the proceedings consistent with its April 3 ruling.78 In and of themselves, these 
elements of the ruling pose no interference with a genocide inquiry. The role of the pretrial judge 
is complete when a case reaches trial, and he or she can have no bearing on the case beyond that 
point. Guatemala’s Criminal Procedure Code does not address reinstating a pretrial judge during 
an active trial, though it seems incongruous that the Court, without a strong reason for doing so, 
would insert this disruption into proceedings rather than maintain Gálvez as the pretrial judge of 
record. 
But the Court’s April 22 ruling went beyond what the Court was asked to rule on; the 
constitutionality of Flores’ order, and further instructed the trial court to reinstate Francisco García 
Gudiel as Ríos Montt’s defense counsel.79 García Gudiel had been ejected for obstruction on the 
trial’s opening day and replaced by counsel of Ríos Montt’s choosing the next day.80 The Court 
73 Republic of Guatemala, Código Procesal Penal, Article 183, “Proof of inadmissibility. A means of proof, to be 
admitted, must refer directly and indirectly to the object of the inquiry and be useful for the discovery of the 
truth.”
74 Republic of Guatemala, Código Procesal Penal, Article 186, “Valuation. Any evidence to be valued must have 
been obtained by a permitted procedure and incorporated into the process in accordance with the provisions 
of this Code. The elements of evidence thus incorporated shall be valued, according to the system of sound 
reasoned criticism, and may not be subject to other legal limitations other than those expressly provided for in 
this Code.”
75 Guatemala Constitutional Court Case File 1097-2013, April 23, 2013.
76 Guatemala Constitutional Court Case Files 1248-2013, April 22, 2013 and 1326-2013, April 23, 2013.
77 See Doyle, Day 20.
78 Guatemala Constitutional Court Case File 1097-2013, April 23, 2013.
79 Guatemala Constitutional Court Case File 1248-2013, April 23, 2013.
80 García Gudiel had announced himself as new counsel for Ríos Montt on the trial’s opening day and immediately 
asked the tribunal for a 5-day suspension to allow him to prepare a defense. This was denied. He then 
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reasoned that the reinstatement of García Gudiel was the restoration of Ríos Montt’s rights under 
due process of law. 
Article 358 of the Criminal Procedure Code gives justification for the tribunal’s expulsion of 
García Gudiel: “The president of the court shall exercise the power of discipline” and can “expel 
the [disruptive] offender from the courtroom,” where offenders may be a “representative of the 
Public Prosecutor’s Office, the defendant, his defense counsel.”  Article 11 provides further basis: 
“The procedural subjects must comply with the decisions of the court and can only challenge them 
by the means and in the form established by law.” 
Here again the Court seems to abandon Criminal Procedure Code law, and overlook behavior 
that disrespects the court, to favor and reward the defense. Ríos Montt had been defended during 
the preceding thirty days by counsel he chose, and it is not clear that his right to counsel of his 
choosing had been violated, as the Court said it had. García Gudiel had appeared impromptu as 
counsel for Ríos Montt, told the court he had not prepared a defense, and had shown intent to 
interfere with the proceedings. It is incongruous that the Court would depart from procedure law 
to restore defense counsel ill-equipped to serve its client or the proceedings. While this element of 
the Court’s ruling poses no interference with a genocide inquiry, the effect and implementation 
of the reinstatement became the basis for the Court’s future claimed due process defect and trial 
annulment.
May 20, 2013 Due Process Violation and Verdict Annulment Ruling81
On May 20, ten days after the trial court declared Ríos Montt guilty of genocide and crimes against 
humanity, the Court, without any verdict appeal by Ríos Montt, issued a ruling that overturned the 
verdict and annulled parts of the trial. The Court ruled that the trial court had “ignored” its April 
23 order to reinstate García Gudiel and instead proceeded with the trial, and that this “improper 
continuation” had “compromised the legal certainty of the criminal proceedings.”82
There are multiple aspects of the ruling that bear consideration with respect to intent to deny 
a genocide inquiry: 
1. Logic. 
 The basis for the Court’s procedure fault ruling was that the trial court hadn’t sufficiently 
complied with the Court’s April 23 ruling to reinstate García Gudiel. The Court conceded 
that García Gudiel had been reinstated but found fault with the trial court’s procedure in 
complying with the order; that the trial court hadn’t suspended the trial for the specific or 
sole purpose of reinstating García Gudiel, or waited for an appellate court to issue a ruling 
on whether the remedies given by the Court’s April 23 ruling had sufficiently restored due 
process. Nor, according to the Court, had the trial waited for an appellate court to rule on 
the merits of a tribunal recusal petition filed by García Gudiel.83 
 But the trial was already in a suspended status from April 19 to April 30, and reinstatements 
of counsel cannot occur when a trial is in a suspended state. The first opportunity to 
reinstate García Gudiel was on April 30—the date when he was in fact reinstated. On that 
challenged the tribunal’s legitimacy in hearing the case. When this challenge was rejected, García Gudiel 
petitioned the court for the recusal of two of the three tribunal judges for bias from previous cases. This 
also was rejected. When García Gudiel continued to demand a suspension of the trial, the tribunal informed 
García Gudiel that he had exhausted the limits of permissible arguments and ejected him from the courtroom 
for obstruction. The tribunal offered Ríos Montt three options for replacing his defense counsel: name prior 
counsel as his counsel of record (Ríos Montt had been previously represented by Francisco Palomo and Danilo 
Rodriguez in matters concerning genocide charges), arrange for new counsel, or be represented by the counsel 
for his co-accused for the remainder of the day. When Ríos Montt chose neither, the tribunal assigned to 
him counsel for his co-accused. The next day, when Ríos Montt appeared without counsel and the tribunal 
proposed a public defender, Ríos Montt arranged for Marco Antonio Cornejo Marroquin as his counsel, who 
arrived within the hour. On March 25 Ríos Montt had added Danilo Rodríguez to his defense.
81 Guatemala Constitutional Court Case File 1904-2013, May 20, 2013.
82 Ibid.
83 See Open Society Justice Initiative, Judging a Dictator, 17-19.
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day, the court re-read the indictment against Ríos Montt and excluded evidence that had 
been presented during the hours that Ríos Montt was without counsel of his choosing. 
Thus, the trial had not resumed prior to or without the reinstatement of García Gudiel. 
There is therefore no rationality in this defect claim because it is procedurally impossible to 
require or implement a suspension when a suspension was already in effect. Judge Gloria 
Patricia Porras, one of two Court judges who opposed this ruling, argued that the trial 
court had already sufficiently responded to the due process issue and that it was therefore 
not necessary to stop the trial. She argued that there was no due process violation given 
the remedies already ordered and implemented, and that the Court’s ruling “abandons all 
procedural logic.” Porras: “It makes no sense for the trial court to suspend the trial once 
these acts had been carried out and the claimed rights had been restored.”84 On May 20, 
the same day as the Court’s annulment ruling, an appeals court issued a ruling confirming 
that the trial court had sufficiently remedied the claimed due process violation.85 
 With respect to the tribunal’s failure to wait for an appellate court to evaluate the merits 
of García Gudiel’s tribunal recusal petition, Ríos Montt’s defense failed to challenge the 
tribunal’s refusal to disqualify judges within the allowable period, and under Criminal 
Procedure Code law the defense cannot later appeal the refusal. The issue of García 
Gudiel’s tribunal recusal petition is therefore moot. 
2. Procedure. 
 Under Guatemala’s Criminal Procedure Code, trial-procedure defect claims must be 
routed through a “Special Appeal” procedure, which does not involve the Constitutional 
Court.86 The Court’s ruling therefore disregards procedures for hearing and deciding due 
process matters, and preempts any decisions an appeal court would have made on this 
matter. Further, the Court’s May 20 ruling grants a remedy never requested by Ríos Montt 
or his defense. Ríos Montt’s lawyers at no time protested the tribunal’s implementation 
of the García Gudiel reinstatement. Further, under Criminal Procedure Code Article 282, 
defective procedure claims must be made “while the act is fulfilled or immediately after it 
has been fulfilled.” With it’s ruling, the Court abandoned these provisions and intervened 
when it had no call to. 
3. Proportion.
 Even if Ríos Montt’s defense had filed a non-compliance complaint with the Court relative 
to the trial court’s reinstatement of García Gudiel, there was never any evidence that 
the claimed non-compliance had caused due process harm such that it would justify the 
effects of the ruling. The Court seems to wholly ignore the weight and significance of the 
evidence presented by the prosecution, and takes issue with minor, ambiguous procedural 
infractions that had no bearing on the evidentiary imbalance in the case. The Court must 
refrain from an opinion on evidence in lower court cases but its overriding duty under 
Criminal Procedure Code Article 477 is to see that State provisions of justice are upheld, 
and specifically that judgements “do not violate constitutional precepts and international 
treaties in the field of human rights.”87 By any measure of objectivity, the prosecution had 
84 For a full reading of Porras’ dissent statement see, Guatemala Constitutional Court Case File 1904-2013, 
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Gloria Patricia Porras Escobar, May 20, 2013.
85Judgment of Constitutional Court of Guatemala in Case of State v. Ríos Montt and Rodriguez Sanchez, Case File 1904-
2013, Decision of May 20, 2013, Part II, Judgment of Amparo Court of First Instance, May 9, 2013, Section III, 
in which the said court found that the trial court “indeed complied with the orders … to give leave to proceed 
with the recusal and abstention motions filed by attorney Francisco García Gudiel and against the members of 
this Court, just as it was ordered to do in the aforesaid judgment....”).
86 Republic of Guatemala, Código Procesal Penal, Articles 49, 281, 282, 394, 398, 399, 404, 406, and 415- 434.
87 Republic of Guatemala, Código Procesal Penal, Article 477 and Republic of Guatemala Political Constitution of 
1985, Article CCIV.
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presented overwhelming evidence of genocidal killing, none of it substantively refuted.88 
García Gudiel did little defending against the charges, and his absence was of little 
consequence to Ríos Montt’s defense. Constitutional Court judge Mauro Chacon, who 
also opposed the ruling, wrote in his dissent statement that Garcia Gudiel89 had enjoined 
the case with the purpose of forcing the recusal of tribunal judges on an unfounded bias 
claim, and that Garcia Gudiel had intentionally obstructed the proceedings.90
Inasmuch as it “abandons all procedural logic,”91 unduly interferes with criminal proceedings 
by ruling when the it had no call to, preempts an appeals process mandated by Guatemala’s Criminal 
Procedure Code, and is “manifestly disproportionate”92 in its effect, this ruling by the Court goes 
to untenable lengths to deny a genocide criminality finding, in violation of both Guatemalan law 
and UNGC obligations. 
May 29, 2013 and June 6, 2013 Amnesty Rulings93
Prior to the trial, amnesty protection sought by Ríos Montt under a 1986 general amnesty decree94 
had twice been rejected by lower courts based on superseding 1996 law95 that explicitly excludes 
crimes of genocide from amnesty. On May 29, nine days after its verdict annulment, the Court held 
a public hearing to hear amnesty arguments. Ríos Montt’s lawyers argued that their client is entitled 
to protection from prosecution provided by 1986 amnesty law, and that no court or superseding 
law can remove it. Following the hearing, the Court issued an order for the lower court to provide 
foundation for its rejection of 1986 amnesty for Ríos Montt. On June 6, the Court held another 
public hearing, in response to a separate and previous Ríos Montt challenge of amnesty rejection 
88 Prosecution testimony had detailed a pattern of deliberate killing. Some 100 eyewitnesses recounted family 
members who were shot at close range, hacked to death, bludgeoned with rocks and knives, strangled to 
death, burned alive, tortured and raped. Witnesses described the burning of houses and villages, and the 
destruction of crops and livestock. Forty-six expert witnesses testified that civilians died in a defenseless state, 
that the Army’s kill-rate during the time in question was consistent with execution-style killing, and that 
the number of indigenous killed was eight times higher than that of non-indigenous. Prosecution evidence 
included references to orders and objectives contained in the Military’s Victoria 82, Firmeza 83, and Sofía 
operating plans. The defense produced eight witnesses who failed to materially refute or challenge prosecution 
evidence. Said UC-Hastings Law Professor Naomi Roht-Arriaza in a video statement from Guatemala during 
the trial, “There’s been a lot of pressure from the defense, saying that the trial isn’t fair. The sense that I’ve 
got is that the trial is basically fair, the problem is that the defense isn’t doing a very good job defending, 
and I think that part of that is because they never thought this was going to come to trial, and so they really 
didn’t prepare very well. Really, their strategy is about delay, their strategy is about either trying to get the 
Constitutional Court or the political process to halt this thing, rather than to carry out a defense.”
89 In response to a May 16, 2013 complaint lodged by Ramon Cadena, the director of the International Commission 
of Jurist regional office, the bar association suspended García Gudiel for one year, finding him in violation 
of ethics codes. The association found that he lacked respect in addressing the tribunal, offending the honor 
and prestige of the judges and the credibility of the justice system, fined him (US$ 660) and ordered a public 
reprimand.
90 For a full reading of Chacon’s dissent statement see, Guatemala Constitutional Court Case File 1386-2013, 
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Mauro Roderico Chacon Corado. 
91 Guatemala Constitutional Court Case File 1904-2013, Porras Dissent Statement, May 20, 2013.
92 Guatemala Constitutional Court Case File 1904-2013, Chacon Dissent Statement, May 20, 2013.
93 Guatemala Constitutional Court Case File 1386-2013.
94 Republic of Guatemala Political Constitution of 1985, Decree VIII- LXXXVI; “General amnesty is hereby granted 
to all persons responsible or accused of having committed political crimes and related common crimes, during 
the period from March 23, 1982 to January 14, 1986. Therefore, no sort of criminal persecution or action might 
be taken or followed against authors and accomplices of such crimes, nor against those who might have 
committed the crime of concealing them; nor against those who might have intervened in any form in their 
repression or persecution.”
95 Republic of Guatemala Political Constitution of 1985, Decree CXLV- XCVI, forming Guatemala’s 1996 National 
Reconciliation Law. Article 8 limits the Law’s amnesty protection for crimes committed during the internal 
armed conflict: “exemption from criminal responsibility will not apply to crimes of genocide, torture or forced 
disappearance.”
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by a lower court, whereupon the same arguments were made, and the same order for foundation 
was made.96
Guatemala’s 1996 National Reconciliation Law voids the 1986 law,97 and holds that “the 
extinction of the criminal responsibility referred in this law will not be applicable to crimes of 
genocide, torture and forced disappearance.” Further, Guatemala had ratified the UNGC well 
before the 1986 law, and UNGC obligations outweigh any protection provided by any domestic 
law. Reopening or maintaining the amnesty debate in the presence of both domestic and 
international law that specifically prohibits amnesty seems to suggest an attempt by the Court 
to preserve criminal exemption for a genocide offender, and thus deny genocide criminality. 
Both Judge Porras and Judge Chacon, the same Court judges who opposed the Court’s verdict 
overturn ruling, opposed the Court’s action to reopen the amnesty issue. In his dissent statement, 
Chacon argued that the law is clear-cut and that there’s no reason for the Court to further entertain 
the issue.98 Porras argued the 1986 amnesty was never valid to begin with because it contradicts 
Guatemala’s commitments under UNGC.  Thus, she argued, the 1986 decree could not have created 
any reasonable expectations of protection, and therefore maintaining the debate is improper.99
Here again, Guatemala’s Constitutional Court had opportunity to rule consistent with 
Guatemalan and international laws but chose instead to rule counter to laws that are very clear 
and straightforward, and it is difficult to consider these deviations from law as anything other than 
efforts to protect Ríos Montt and Guatemala from a genocide charge. 
February 5, 2014 Ruling on Claudia Paz y Paz’ Term100
Claudia Paz y Paz Bailey, who had brought the genocide case against Ríos Montt, had been 
appointed to replace Conrado Reyes in 2010 as Prosecutor General, after Reyes resigned on 
charges of corruption seven months into his term.101 Following the trial, a petition was filed with 
Guatemala’s Constitutional Court arguing that Paz y Paz’ term ends in May 2014 and not December 
2014 since she had replaced a Prosecutor General seven months into an existing term. The petition 
named transitory constitutional articles that if applied would consider her term a fill-in assignment 
rather than a full 4-year appointment.102 On February 5, 2015 the Court unanimously granted the 
appeal.103 
The ruling is a violation of Article 251 of Guatemala’s Constitution, which establishes the 
Prosecutor General’s term as four years, and that only by the President and for “duly established 
96 See Emi Maclean, “One Month After Guatemala’s Constitutional Court Intervenes to Challenge Rios Montt 
Genocide Conviction: Amnesty Back on the Table, New Trial Court Booked Till Mid-2014, and Rios Montt 
Back Home,” International Justice Monitor, June 18, 2013, accessed March 22, 2018, https://www.ijmonitor.
org/2013/06/one-month-after-guatemalas-constitutional-court-intervenes-to-challenge-rios-montt-genocide-
conviction-amnesty-back-on-the-table-new-trial-court-booked-till-mid-2014-and-rios-montt-back-home/; Emi 
Maclean, “One Week After Overturning Former Dictator’s Genocide Conviction, Guatemalan Constitutional 
Court Considers Whether Rios Montt Should Benefit from 1986 Amnesty,” International Justice Monitor, May 
20, 2013, accessed March 27, 2018, https://www.ijmonitor.org/2013/05/one-week-after-overturning-former-
dictators-genocide-conviction-guatemalan-constitutional-court-hears-claim-that-rios-montt-should-benefit-
from-1986-amnesty/.
97 Republic of Guatemala Political Constitution of 1985, Decree CXXXIII-CXCVII, issued December 1997, repealed 
all amnesty laws prior to 1996. 
98 Guatemala Constitutional Court Case File 1097-2013, April 23, 2013.
99 Ibid.
100 Guatemala Constitutional Court Case File 461-2014, February 5, 2014.
101 Asier Andrés “Presidente Juramenta a la Nueva Fiscal General,” El Periodico, December 10, 2010, https://web.
archive.org/web/20140222044140/http://www.elperiodico.com.gt/es/20101210/pais/185734.
102 See Paul N. Avakian, “Guatemala’s Praised Attorney General To Step Down Under Controversy,” Truthout, 
March 17, 2014.
103 Constitutional Court: “Circumstances make it advisable to grant the interim relief requested, and [with] the 
positive effects of constitutional protection now granted, Congress should immediately, from the moment 
notified, hold a meeting, continuously and without interruption, in order to issue the call for the formation of 
the Nominating Committee.”
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cause”104 can the Prosecutor General be removed from office. Further, there is no basis for invoking 
transitory articles against Article 251 because transitional provisions regulate an event at a specific 
time, and once they accomplish the purpose for which they were enacted, they become void. 
Paz y Paz had made unprecedented strides in reducing crime in Guatemala and in dismantling its 
organized crime networks, and had gained international recognition for human rights justice.105 
The want for her early removal would only have come from those hurt or threatened by her work106 
or those who wish to punish her for prosecuting the Ríos Montt genocide case.
Other actions against Ríos Montt trial participants were:
• On May 14, Moises Galindo, a Ríos Montt trial defense attorney, filed to impeach Judge 
Yasmin Barrios, who presided over the Ríos Montt trial, after she was observed having 
breakfast with three people said to have been from NGOs who supported the genocide 
trial.107
• On June 20, 2014, Judge Gisela Reinoso issued a ruling that froze Claudia Paz y Paz’ 
financial assets and barred her from leaving Guatemala pending the outcome of a civil 
dispute between the Ministerio Público and Globalcorp International, a computer vendor, 
where Globalcorp charged Paz y Paz with abuse of authority, dereliction of duty, 
violations of Constitutional resolutions, default, malicious delay, obstruction of justice, 
and conspiracy.108 
• On April 4 Judge Barrios was fined and disbarred by Guatemala’s bar association for a 
year after a complaint was filed by Moises Galindo, a Ríos Montt trial defense attorney, 
who felt she disrespected him during the Ríos Montt trial.109
• On April 13, 2015, Judge Darwin Porras issued a ruling that prohibited Ministerio Público 
prosecutor Orlando López from leaving Guatemala pending the outcome of a criminal 
investigation into public statements López made in Spain in 2014. The complaint was 
brought by Ricardo Mendez Ruiz, the son of Ríos Montt’s former interior minister and the 
sponsor of a series of anti-trial newspaper advertisements published during the trial. In 
Spain, López had spoken about the trial and impunity in Guatemala. The complaint sought 
an investigation into López’ associations, and into whether there are “other employees 
with totalitarian ideological tendencies which jeopardize the criminal and constitutional 
rights of defendants.”110 
These also appear to be politically motivated punishments meant to discredit, remove or in 
some way hamper prosecutors and judges who had protagonist roles in the Ríos Montt genocide 
trial. Inasmuch as these punishments inhibit or interfere with the prosecution of genocide crimes, 
they deny the crime.
104 American Bar Association, Prosecutorial Reform, 42.
105 In 2012, Paz y Paz was named by Forbes Magazine as one of the “five most powerful women changing the 
world.” In 2013, she was awarded US Berkley’s Judith Lee Stronach Human Rights Award, and that same year 
was nominated for the 2013 Nobel Peace Prize.
106 Only two Prosecutor Generals have served out their full term. Most have been removed for political reasons. See 
American Bar Association, Prosecutorial Reform, 20, 21, 42, 43.
107“Abogado Interpone Solicitud de Antejuicio Contra Jueza Jazmín Barrios,” Emisoras Unidas, May 14, 2013.
108 See Emi MacLean, “Judge Imposes Travel Ban on Prosecutor Following His Public Statements About Historic 
Genocide Trial,” International Justice Monitor, April 14, 2015, accessed March 23, 2018, https://www.ijmonitor.
org/2015/04/judge-prohibits-imposes-travel-ban-on-prosecutor-following-his-public-statements-about-historic-
genocide-trial/.
109 On April 4, 2014, Guatemala’s Bar Association issued a resolution dated January 9, 2014 suspending Judge 
Yassmin Barrios from practicing law for one year based a complaint filed by an attorney Moisés Galindo, 
defense counsel for José Mauricio Rodríguez. Moisés Galindo was ordered to assume the defense of Ríos Montt 
when Ríos Montt’s sole counsel was expelled for disruption. Galindo accused Judge Barrios of disrespecting 
and publicly humiliating him. See NISIGUA, Interview with Judge Yassmín Barrios, “The Door to Impunity 
and Corruption is being Opened,” April 8, 2014, accessed March 23, 2018, https://nisgua.org/interview-with-
judge-yassmin-barrios-the-door-to-impunity-and-corruption-is-being-opened/.
110 MacLean, Judge Imposes Travel Ban. 
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In each of these seven rulings by Guatemala’s Constitutional Court laws and procedures 
established by Guatemala’s Constitution, Criminal Procedure Code, and its commitments to 
international treaties were consistently violated, abandoned, vacated, or disregarded. In each case 
the ruling favored a no-genocide finding. Where it did explain its rulings, its logic was faulty, 
incorrect or inadequate. In some cases, the Court’s constitutional mandate was exceeded, and the 
Court ruled on matters it was not petitioned to rule on—in each case impeding the inquiry into 
whether Ríos Montt and his co-accused had committed genocide in the Ixil massacre. If indeed the 
denial of genocide is concerned with the denial of what is due victims and society when the crime 
has been or may have been committed, these rulings by Guatemala’s Constitutional Court and the 
failures of duty by Guatemala’s MP and military demonstrate a new category of denial behavior 
that arises when states investigate and prosecute their massacre crimes.
Conclusion
The prevailing notion of genocide denial as an act of speech stands to broaden when we consider 
the full range of what is withheld in denying the crime. Words that reject outright, re-characterize, 
confuse, or shift blame bring harm on an emotional level, but the real omissions associated with 
denial come when the crime goes unpunished. To deny a crime is to deny what is owed those 
harmed by the crime, and that involves punishment and restitution according to relevant law. 
Corruption is always a factor in denial. In verbal denials truth is corrupted. But denial also manifests 
itself as a corruption of duty to investigate and prosecute the crime, corruption in the interpretation 
and application of law, in the obligation to punish and prevent—and the examples in this paper 
demonstrate that the will to avoid a genocide finding is a more powerful force than any duty of 
truth, fairness or integrity. 
Had the country not taken steps to institutionalize transparency and separations of power in 
its criminal justice system twenty-three years before the trial, we might say Guatemala was not 
yet ready to process a genocide charge.  Had it not the laws, procedures and protocols in place for 
adjudicating such a crime we might say that a capability was not yet present to hold accountable 
those responsible for Guatemala’s massacres. But the necessary elements were present, and had 
been for over two decades, and so it is hard to say that the system was inadequate. 
The fact that each of the seven Constitutional Court rulings analyzed here deterred an inquiry 
into genocide criminality does not in and of itself make them refutations of genocide occurrence 
by the Court. Not every failing of a justice system is a denial of the crime at hand. To assess denial 
we must examine intent, and to examine intent we must make deductions based on behavior. Had 
the Court followed law in its rulings we would have no reason to question denial intent in them. 
Had it provided sound reasoning for deviating each time from constitutional and criminal code 
law, and from its requirements under international law, we might have less basis for considering 
whether the Court was predisposed to a no-genocide result. Where the Court did justify and give 
basis for its rulings, its reasoning was illogical and counter to protocol given by law. Had the 
Court demonstrated a history of independence in its rulings, and in particular, rulings concerning 
military accountability for human rights crimes, we might not pause to consider what transpired in 
Guatemala. But we know that Guatemala’s Constitutional Court is comprised of judges who have 
been placed there for reasons less to do with merit and impartiality, and more to do with political 
favors. We know that Guatemala is a country with a long history of impunity and institutional 
corruption, and studies have shown that Guatemala’s judiciary is susceptible to bias. We cannot 
know the mind of Court judges at the time of their rulings. We can only observe their actions and 
compare them to what law provides. In each case discussed in this paper, Guatemala’s Constitutional 
Court had every opportunity to rule according to law, and in each case ruled counter to it.
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